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ORIGINALISM AS THIN DESCRIPTION:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE
Saul Cornell*
More than a half century ago, the distinguished American historian John
Higham noted the emergence of intellectual history as a vital tool for
humanists across a variety of disciplines. Writing with an enviable lucidity
and a generosity of spirit, Higham observed that “intellectual history has
been the work of many hands, and we have come to do it from all the points
of the academic compass. Philosophers, literary scholars, historians, and
others have converged upon one another, bringing their various interests,
backgrounds and methods to a common task.”1
Since Higham made his observations more than fifty years ago, the field
has seen its ups and downs. Despite some predictions that intellectual
history might not survive the assault of post-structuralist theory and postmodernism more generally, its methods are now nearly ubiquitous in the
humanities.2 Even beyond the humanities, intellectual history has become
an important tool in other fields, such as law.3
Given these facts, it is a bit puzzling to read Lawrence Solum’s
discussion of intellectual history in his recent essay, Intellectual History as
Constitutional Theory.4 Rather than acknowledge how widely accepted its
methods have become, he treats intellectual history as if it were some type
of esoteric knowledge, a form of cabalistic teaching shrouded in mystery
whose techniques are jealously guarded by its disciples.5 Quite the opposite
is true—the field is not only extremely vital, but it embraces a dazzling
range of topics and methodological eclecticism. Given intellectual history’s
* Paul and Diane Guenther Chair in American History, Fordham University.
1. John Higham, Intellectual History and Its Neighbors, 15 J. HIST. IDEAS 339, 399
(1954).
2. For an overview of trends in the field over the last half century, see generally
Anthony Grafton, The History of Ideas: Precept and Practice, 1950–2000 and Beyond, 67 J.
HIST. IDEAS 1 (2006). On intellectual history and philosophy, see Richard Rorty, The
Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres, in PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE
HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY 49 (Richard Rorty et al. eds., 1984). On intellectual
history in literary studies, see Richard Macksey, The History of Ideas at 80, 117 MLN 1083
(2002).
3. See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA: ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS
(1997); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2003).
4. Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV.
1111 (2015).
5. For an examination of such esoteric teachings, see GERSHOM SCHOLEM, MAJOR
TRENDS IN JEWISH MYSTICISM (1954).
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pervasive influence in contemporary American scholarly life, it is odd that
Solum would fault my article for not providing him with a simple recipe for
practicing it.6 Instead of providing a primer for using intellectual history,
which I assumed was unnecessary, I highlighted a number of specific
developments in recent American intellectual history that I believed might
be particularly helpful to constitutional historians.7 Specifically, I noted
that recent work in the history of the book and historical studies of reading
suggest a range of strategies for reconstructing how individuals and
distinctive interpretive communities might have read various constitutional
texts at the time of the Founding.8
My essay was intended as a critique of originalism from the perspective
of intellectual history. I pointed out that originalism lacked a rigorous
empirical method for analyzing what texts meant in the past.9 I suppose in
some sense it is flattering that Solum has devoted much of his recent article
to an attack on my earlier essay. Of course, flattery aside, it would have
been more useful if Solum had stated my thesis correctly.10 For purposes of
clarity, I have juxtaposed Solum’s description of my argument with what
my essay actually said. Readers will be able to judge for themselves if
Solum correctly captured the original meaning of my words.

6. Saul Cornell, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Constitutional Ideas:
The Intellectual History Alternative to Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 721 (2013)
[hereinafter Cornell, Meaning and Understanding]. The methods of the history of the book
discussed in that essay were based, in part, on anthropological and ethnographic
methodology. The theoretical implications of ethnography for questions about original
meaning are discussed infra pp. 6–7.
7. Cornell, Meaning and Understanding, supra note 6, at 725–33.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 740–47.
10. In his recent Virginia Law Review essay, Solum calls for disciplinary modesty. This
claim is hard to reconcile with his previous writing on this topic. In a long footnote in his
article defending District of Columbia v. Heller, Solum suggests my claim that legal scholar
Stephen M. Griffin’s critique of new originalism, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1185 (2008), provided a thoughtful critique of semantic originalism was literally
irrational: “No passage in the article that Cornell cites can reasonable [sic] be construed as
‘a thoughtful critique of Solum’s variant of originalism.’” Lawrence B. Solum, District of
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 947 n.113 (2009). As is
generally true with his writings on originalism, Solum appears to have missed the
philosophical forest for the trees. My point was very simple, even if I failed to communicate
that point clearly enough for him. Griffin’s theory was a general critique of new originalism
and hence applied to all variants of new originalism with equal force. Therefore, logically,
the critique would also apply to Solum’s new originalism. If my premise is true, the logic of
the argument is difficult to challenge. Admittedly, Solum may disagree with my premise,
which is an interpretive question, not a logical one. His claim that my argument is literally
irrational is not only pompous, but also intellectually ludicrous.
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Originalist Solum’s Reading of
Cornell
“It might be argued that
intellectual history could constitute
a theory and method of
constitutional interpretation—or to
be more precise, of constitutional
interpretation and construction.
Professor Saul Cornell has
discussed this possibility in his
recent article, Meaning and
Understanding in the History
of Constitutional Ideas:
The
Intellectual History Alternative to
Originalism.”11

3

Cornell’s Original Text
“If legal scholars and judges wish
to continue to make serious claims
about what the Constitution meant in
the Founding era, they will need to
master the basic methods of
intellectual history.
Jettisoning
originalism in favor of a method
grounded in intellectual history
will not eliminate all ideological
distortion. Better history will not end
results-oriented judging, but it
will facilitate a more honest and
intellectually rigorous discussion
about what various provisions of the
Constitution meant to different legal
audiences in the Founding era.
Deciding which, if any, of these
different
historically
grounded
interpretations ought to guide us
when interpreting the Constitution
today is not a question that history
can answer.
These choices are
inescapably philosophical or political
decisions.”12

Although, I suppose, Solum is technically correct to say it may be argued
that intellectual history could provide a theory of constitutional
interpretation, that was not the thesis I advanced. In fact, my essay made
the opposite argument. My argument was fairly simple: if one wishes to
understand what the Constitution meant at a particular point in the past, one
needs a rigorous historical method to recover the range of meanings it
might have had for various groups living at the time. I argued that
intellectual history provided a tried and true method for accomplishing this
goal.13 The relevance of this historical information to constitutional theory
and jurisprudence is not itself a historical question, but a legal and political
one. My goal was not to enhance the importance of history to constitutional
theory, but to diminish it.
There is little point in responding to Solum’s facile critique of intellectual
history and to his glib dismissals of the work of eminent scholars such as
11. Solum, supra note 4, at 1113.
12. Cornell, Meaning and Understanding, supra note 6, at 755 (emphasis added).
13. There are a variety of interpretive strategies available to explore the meaning of
historical texts that do not follow the American model of intellectual history or the
Cambridge School. For a brief overview of these alternative methods, see Grafton, supra
note 2.

4

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW RES GESTAE

[Vol. 84

David Hollinger, James Kloppenberg, and Quentin Skinner. Until Solum
takes the time to read deeply and thoughtfully the literature of intellectual
history, and obtains more than a smattering of familiarity with the scholars
he criticizes, there is nothing to be gained from engaging with a critique
based on a superficial reading of a few texts, some of which are now almost
half a century old. Any serious evaluation of these scholars would require a
careful examination of their theoretical writings, empirical scholarship, and
the complex connections between theory and practice in their writing.14
In a brief essay it would be impossible to address all of the theoretical
and methodological flaws in Solum’s simplistic model of constitutional
communication.15 Solum describes his approach as follows: “Because
constitutional communication (like legal communication generally) is
simply a form of human communication, theories of constitutional
interpretation must be reconciled with the general theory of the way
linguistic communication works that has been developed in the philosophy
of language and theoretical linguistics.”16
The first problem with such a claim is that it mistakenly asserts that there
is a clear consensus in the philosophy of language about how to approach
issues of meaning. This statement is clearly false. Philosophers remain
deeply divided over these types of questions.17 Even if one assumes that
some variant of Gricean pragmatics (the model Solum favors) is the correct
theory to understand constitutional communication, Solum’s adaptation of
Gricean ideas is idiosyncratic at best and arguably is simply wrongheaded.
The claim that constitutional communication is just another form of
ordinary communication and must conform to the models used to
14. Solum admits that he has not bothered to read widely in the vast body of scholarship
produced by the scholars he criticizes, a confession that would be shocking in almost any
other field outside of originalism. Cf. Solum, supra note 4, at 1139. Solum’s claims about
Skinner’s interpretation of Wittgenstein and Grice ignore the divisions over the philosophy
of language in the postwar period. For a very different account of those debates by one of
the leading participants in them, see generally John Searle, Grice on Meaning: 50 Years
Later, 26 TEOREMA 9 (2007). In much the same way that Solum and other originalists
approach the Founding era in terms of a consensus model of history, Solum’s discussion of
the reception of thinkers such as Wittgenstein and Grice is similarly reductionist. For a good
example of a recent critique of Skinner that acknowledges the need to look at theory and
practice, see Peter E. Gordon, Contextualism and Criticism in the History of Ideas, in
RETHINKING MODERN EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 32 (Darrin M. McMahon &
Samuel Moyn eds., 2014).
15. A full exploration of all of the theoretical problems with Solum’s adaptation of Grice
is beyond the scope of this essay. Most of Grice’s important essays are available in PAUL
GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989). For a good introduction to Grice’s theory
and its significance, see Stephen Neale, Paul Grice and the Philosophy of Language, 15
LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 509 (1992).
16. Solum, supra note 4, at 1122.
17. For a good overview of these debates, see Jeff Speaks, Theories of Meaning,
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/ [http://perma.cc/MB66-8CXF]. Other scholars
have also acknowledged the ongoing nature of these debates. See Michael Wolf,
Philosophy of Language, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (June 7, 2015),
http://www.iep.utm.edu/lang-phi/ [http://perma.cc/U4CU-NEWB]; see also WILLIAM G.
LYCAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 86–97 (2d ed. 2000);
MICHAEL MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 248–70 (2006).
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comprehend ordinary language is also questionable.18 There are many
forms of communication that do not conform to the rules governing
ordinary language, for example, poetry, politics, and oratory.19 Rather than
solve the problems traditional intentionalist versions of originalism faced,
Solum has simply smuggled many of these problems through the back door
and camouflaged them under a new philosophically inflected discourse.20
Solum assumes the goal of constitutional speech is analogous to ordinary
speech—an assumption that seems dubious at best and is most likely
false.21 Grice’s theory assumes that speech is a cooperative process guided
by a set of conversational maxims that facilitate the goals of
communication. Philosopher of language Andrei Marmor has persuasively
argued that Grice’s maxims are not a good match for the goals of legal
speech, which are often strategic, not cooperative.22 One can extend
Marmor’s important insight by noting that many of the texts Solum and
other originalists use to determine original meaning were originally uttered
in a contentious public political debate. The suggestion that political
speech, particularly speech in post-Revolutionary America, was typically
truthful, concise, relevant, and maximally informative is hard to reconcile
with the evidence from ratification.23 This was certainly not how
The opponents of the
Federalists viewed Anti-Federalist texts.24
18. See generally Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication?
Legal
Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
19. The complex connections between philosophy and literature are well beyond the
scope of this essay; for a range of views, see generally GARRY HABERG & WALTER JOST, A
COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LITERATURE (2010). For an ambitious, but not entirely
successful, effort to try to develop a speech act theory of literature using Grice and other
philosophers of language, see MARY LOUISE PRATT, TOWARD A SPEECH ACT THEORY OF
LITERARY DISCOURSE (1977).
20. A number of traditional originalists have argued that Solum’s theory is parasitic on
earlier intentionalist theories. See Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 82
FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013); Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in
Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703 (2009). Rather than solve the
traditional summing of intents problem, Solum simply takes semantic meaning as a proxy for
communicative intent. For a philosophical critique of this assumption, see Gregory Bassham
& Ian Oakley, New Textualism: The Potholes Ahead, 28 RATIO JURIS 127 (2015).
21. See Andrei Marmor, Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? On Some Pragmatic
Aspects of Strategic Speech, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) (discussing how legal speech deviates from
ordinary conversation and speech).
22. Id. As Marmor notes, the maxims governing constitutional communication are
shaped by strategic concerns, not cooperative principles. Id. An additional complication
arises from the fact that in contrast to ordinary conversation or even normal legislation, it is
unclear who the parties to the constitutional conversation are and how their potentially
divergent assumptions and interpretive rules impact meaning.
23. For a useful discussion of Gricean maxims, see A. P. MARTINICH, COMMUNICATION
AND REFERENCE 17–37 (1984).
24. Alexander Hamilton warned readers about “passions and prejudices little favorable
to the discovery of truth” that would warp public debate over the Constitution. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). He also reminded readers about the danger of
being duped by “the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations which have been in
various ways practiced to keep the truth from the public eye.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 85
(Alexander Hamilton).
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Constitution were no less likely to treat their opponents’ speech as
rhetorical and hence deeply suspect.25 To understand these political
expressions, one must situate them in the rhetorical and ideological contexts
of post-Revolutionary era debate.
Solum’s claim that his theory is supported by contemporary linguistics is
hard to reconcile with the evidence gathered by linguistic anthropologists.26
Solum either has not consulted any works in this field or he has missed the
central insights gathered by this discipline over the last forty years of
scholarship. One of the foundational concepts in this field is the distinction
between the interrelated concepts of linguistic community and speech
community. Although English speakers in America in 1788 may have been
part of the same linguistic community, they were not all members of the
same speech community.27 As the distinguished linguistic anthropologist
Alessandro Durati notes, “one of the reasons for taking the speech
community as the starting point for linguistic research was to avoid the
assumption that the sharing of the same ‘language’ implies shared
understanding of its use and meaning in various contexts.”28 Put simply,
Solum’s entire analytical framework violates the most basic research
protocols in ethnographic inquiry: to identify and define the complex
relationships among the different speech communities within a particular

25. Anti-Federalists made similar charges about Federalists. See Commentaries on the
Constitution (Sept. 27, 1787), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009),
http://csac.history.wisc.edu/cato1.pdf [http://perma.cc/C2VW-LQT5].
Many political
utterances are marked by so-called sneaky intentions, a category Grice expressly excluded
from his model. On the problem sneaky intentions pose for the Gricean model, see Peter
Pagin, Assertion, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/assertion/ [http://perma.cc/HR896KBN]. Solum ignores this issue, which provides another example of his failure to grasp an
important aspect of Gricean theory. The result is a type of “law office philosophy,” an
analogue to the more common genre of “law office history” typical of originalism. For a
brief discussion of the problem of law office history and originalism, see Cornell, Meaning
and Understanding, supra note 6.
26. Alessandro Duranti, The Ethnography of Speaking: Toward a Linguistics of the
Praxis, in 4 LINGUISTICS: THE CAMBRIDGE SURVEY 210, 217 (Frederick J. Newmeyer ed.,
1988); Elizabeth Keating, The Ethnography of Communication, in HANDBOOK OF
ETHNOGRAPHY 285, 290–92 (Paul Atkinson et al. eds., 2001). Solum’s model is also
incompatible with the dominant models within sociolinguistics. See DELL HYMES,
FOUNDATIONS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH (1974).
27. In his unpublished manuscript, Solum briefly deals with multiple speech
communities as an unlikely possibility. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism
(Nov. 22, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1120244 [http://perma.cc/4CZQ-MD3Y]. The theoretical fix Solum proposes to
deal with this situation is a “linguistic division of labor.” Id. at 110. The existence of a
division of labor in matters of constitutional meaning is yet another empirical question.
Rather than determine if this was the actual practice in the Founding era, Solum simply
borrows a neat concept from a philosophy book on his shelf. This purported theoretical
“solution” is yet another example of his ahistorical and anachronistic approach to Founding
era texts, practices, and issues of meaning. It affords an additional example of his inability
to grasp the power dynamics shaping discursive practices in the Founding era.
28. See Duranti, supra note 26, at 217.
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linguistic community.29 The degree of linguistic consensus Solum posits
for post-Revolutionary America exceeds anything linguistic anthropologists
have ever documented in decades of field research.30
Solum’s theory is not only hard to reconcile with the empirical evidence
gathered by anthropologists about linguistic diversity, it also does not fit the
available historical evidence about Founding era constitutional culture. The
Founding era was not characterized by consensus, but rather was defined by
profound conflicts over the meaning of the Constitution’s terms,
constitutional interpretive methods, and constitutional aspirations. Yet,
reading Solum’s work, one would be hard pressed to see any recognition of
this process of contestation.31 Solum’s flawed method effectively blinds
him to the existence of these conflicts. Although English-speaking
members of the Founding generation may have been part of a common
linguistic community, they were not all members of the same constitutional
“speech community.”32 The farmers who took up arms against the
government of Massachusetts during Shays’ Rebellion and the wealthy
merchants in Boston who opposed them may have each spoken eighteenthcentury American English, but their constitutional discourses were
distinctive and different in important ways. The meanings of key terms
such as “contract,” “debt,” “justice,” and “bear Arms” were not the same in
these two speech communities.33 Founding-era America was a complex
society in which constitutional speech was inflected by distinctive regional,
class, and ideological differences.34 Solum and other originalists have
simply ignored these differences, and the result is an account of the past
that reduces its polyphony to a monotonous drone. Indeed, if Solum and
other originalists’ consensual models of constitutional speech were correct,
it would mean that Founding-era America attained a level of linguistic and
ideological homogeneity never achieved in any society studied by
This is the discredited theory of American
anthropologists.35
exceptionalism on steroids.36
29. MURIEL SAVILLE-TROIKE, THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF COMMUNICATION:
AN
INTRODUCTION 14–18 (3d ed. 2003).
30. See ALESSANDRO DURANTI, LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 82 (1997).
31. See Seth Cotlar, The View from Mount Vernon Versus the People Out of Doors:
Context and Conflict in the Ratification Debates, 69 WM. & MARY Q. 369, 371 (2012); see
also Todd Estes, Power and Point of View in the Ratification Contest, 69 WM. & MARY Q.
398, 400 (2012).
32. Duranti, supra note 30; see also Peter L. Patrick, The Speech Community, in
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE VARIATION AND CHANGE 573 (J.K. Chambers et al. eds., 2002).
33. LEONARD L. RICHARDS, SHAYS’S REBELLION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION’S FINAL
BATTLE (2002); see also ROBERT GROSS, IN DEBT TO SHAYS: THE BICENTENNIAL OF AN
AGRARIAN REBELLION (1993).
34. WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
(2007). If one includes distinctions of race and gender, the heterogeneity of Founding-era
America is even more pronounced. See JEFFREY L. PASLEY ET AL., BEYOND THE FOUNDERS:
NEW APPROACHES TO THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2004).
35. For another originalist who shares this ideological view, see Randy E. Barnett,
Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 (2011). For other
problematic strains of new originalism that assume the existence of a consensus where none
existed, see Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L.
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Solum claims that his theory deals with context, but the approach he
takes is one of thin description.
By contrast, most historians,
ethnographers, and anthropologists prefer approaches to context that favor
thick description.37 Solum proudly boasts that his account of early
American constitutional meaning rests on an analysis of the linguistic
facts.38 In this regard, Solum has assumed a role analogous to the detective
in the iconic postwar television cop show Dragnet. When interrogating
witnesses, “Officer Joe Friday” routinely informed them that he was
interested in “just the facts.”39 Solum has adopted much the same method.
The problem with this approach is that individuals do not communicate
with lists of linguistic facts. The ratification debate was not a struggle
between Federalist and Anti-Federalist dictionaries. The newspaper essays,
pamphlets, and convention speeches that constitute the primary body of
sources for understanding the public debate over ratification were complex
rhetorical constructions shaped by the conventions of post-Revolutionary
era political and legal discourse.40 Semantic originalism’s pursuit of the
linguistic facts makes no distinction between different types of texts,
rhetorical styles, or the settings in which speech occurs; nor does Solum’s
REV. 1539 (2005); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods
Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 751 (2009); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and
How Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037 (2006).
36. See Michael Kammen, The Problem of American Exceptionalism:
A
Reconsideration, 45 AM. Q. 1 (1993); see also John Higham, Changing Paradigms: The
Collapse of Consensus History, 76 J. AM. HIST. 460 (1989).
37. Ethnography and anthropology have each had major impacts on American Studies.
See Gene Wise, “Paradigm Dramas” in American Studies: A Cultural and Institutional
History of the Movement, 31 AM. Q. 293, 322 (1979). On their influence on history, see
William H. Sewell Jr., Geertz, Cultural Systems, and History: From Synchrony to
Transformation, 59 REPRESENTATIONS 35, 35 (1997); Hans Medick, “Missionaries in the
Row Boat”? Ethnological Ways of Knowing as a Challenge to Social History, 29 COMP.
STUD. IN SOC’Y & HIST. 76 (1987). On the notion of constitutional ethnography, see Kim
Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 389,
390–91 (2004). On the need to merge studies of pragmatics with insights from ethnography
and linguistic anthropology, particularly regarding the nature of language and power, see
Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Language: Pragmatics, Poetics, and Social Power, 23 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 435 (1994).
38. See Solum, supra note 4, at 1128; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and
Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 479 (2013).
39. ERIC PARTRIDGE, A DICTIONARY OF CATCH PHRASES 14 (Paul Beale ed., 2d ed.
1985).
40. On Anti-Federalist patterns of reading during ratification, see SAUL CORNELL, THE
OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–
1828 (1999) [hereinafter CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS]. Once again, Solum’s focus on
“linguistic facts” ignores the role of setting, scene, genre, and other basic categories of
analysis central to the ethnography of speech. Dell Hymes’s influential SPEAKING model
has become a standard starting point for ethnographic inquiry; for a concise explication of
this model, see Donal Carbaugh, Ethnography of Communication, in THE BLACKWELL
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMMUNICATION (Wolfgang Donsbach ed., 2007). The
foundational text in this field remains DELL HYMES, FOUNDATIONS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS: AN
ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH (1974). On the methodological and theoretical convergence of
sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, see John J. Gumperz & Jenny Cook-Gumperz,
Studying Language, Culture, and Society: Sociolinguistics or Linguistic Anthropology?, 12
J. OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS 532 (2008).
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model deal with the divergent interpretive practices that were in place in
different speech communities during the Founding era.41 Ironically, Solum
and other originalists are much more gullible readers than most eighteenthcentury historical actors. Readers in the Founding era were exceedingly
sensitive to the tone, style, and ideology of the texts they read and the
speeches they heard.42 Solum likens constitutional texts to messages in a
bottle.43 Context in his model functions like a bucket filled with facts—
pour the contents of the bottle into the bucket and out comes meaning. This
is a simplistic model of constitutional communication. Reducing complex
and contentious events such as the American Revolution, the Articles of
Confederation, or the common law to simple contextual facts is yet another
illustration of the profound problems with Solum’s “Joe Friday” approach
to meaning.44 Rather than treat contexts in this static fashion, linguistic
anthropologists and ethnographers acknowledge that speakers must
dynamically construct contexts from among the myriad available options.
Although historical actors retain some agency in this process, the process of
constructing a relevant context for any utterance is not simply time bound
as Solum maintains, but it is also ideologically constrained.45
One of the biggest problems with Solum’s model is his failure to attribute
any agency to individual historical actors. In Solum’s theory, individuals
are used by language; they do not use language. Originalism in this sense is
literally an “idiotic” constitutional theory.46 It treats most Americans in the
Founding era as if they were voiceless: empty vessels for holding linguistic
41. Solum places a great deal of emphasis on Grice’s concept of implicature. Yet,
without an ability to discern Gricean speaker meaning for the Constitution, the utility of this
concept seems questionable. Moreover, discerning Gricean conversational implicature
requires a clear sense of the relevant conversational maxims, something Solum has never
identified in his extensive writings on this topic. On Gricean implicature, see Wayne Davis,
Implicature, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature [http://perma.cc/8SJX-XMNQ]. Most recently,
Solum has invoked the concept of pragmatic enrichment. See François Recanati, Pragmatic
Enrichment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 67 (Gillian
Russell & Delia Graff Fara eds., 2012). While this construct represents some thickening of
his conception of context, his treatment remains radically underdeveloped, under-theorized,
and exceedingly thin.
42. On patterns of reading during ratification, see CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS,
supra note 40.
43. ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A
DEBATE 57 (2011).
44. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning (Feb. 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2559701 [http://perma.cc/EK5G-T75T].
45. ALESSANDRO DURANTI & CHARLES GOODWIN, RETHINKING CONTEXT: LANGUAGE AS
AN INTERACTIVE PHENOMENON 5–6, 8–9 (1992) (discussing the role of ideology in shaping
the ability of actors to construct linguistic contexts and challenging the static approach to
pragmatics typical of much philosophical analysis).
46. Idiocy in this sense builds on Hannah Arendt’s classically inflected analysis of
politics. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 38 (2d ed. 1998); see also DAVID
MILLER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2003). For a discussion of
originalism and the problem of constitutional idiocy, see Saul Cornell, The People’s
Constitution vs. The Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original
Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 300–04 (2011).
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and contextual facts. By ignoring human agency, originalists, including
Solum, are guilty of succumbing to the “enormous condescension of
posterity,” a pernicious and ahistorical bias that the great English historian
E.P. Thompson warned against in his classic study, The Making of the
English Working Class.47 By effectively silencing discordant voices and
turning what was a lively and raucous public debate into a dull placid affair,
Solum produces an ideologically distorted vision of the Founding. This
approach drains politics from one of the most politically contentious
moments in American history. To the extent that it was possible to fix the
constitutional meaning for any provision of the Constitution (apart from the
most trivial constitutional questions), such a process was a function of
political and ideological forces, not the neutral philosophical application of
a set of universal truths about language.
The time has surely arrived to abandon the simplistic approach to
language and history associated with nearly all versions of originalism,
including Solum’s semantic originalism. Rather than dismiss intellectual
history, Solum and other originalists would do well to master a few of its
more basic techniques.

47. E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS 12 (1964). For an
evaluation of Thompson’s influence on legal history, see Robert W. Gordon, E.P.
Thompson’s Legacies, 82 GEO. L.J. 2005 (1994). For other examples of originalist
scholarship that display “the condescension of posterity,” see Prakash & Yoo, supra note 35,
and McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 35.

